Tuesday, February 24, 2004
http://journalism.medill.northwestern.edu/docket/00-1737leedy.html
story about cantwell v connecticut, in light of watchtower.
story about cantwell v connecticut, in light of watchtower.
watchtower amicus pdf center for individual freedom eric jaffe
http://www.socialism.com/elections/motion.html
freedom socialist party won exemption from disclosure.
ky rtl v terry.
freedom socialist party won exemption from disclosure.
ky rtl v terry.
New Hampshire Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1996).
Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W. 2d 873 (Ky. 1976); but see People v. White, 116 Ill. 2d 171, 506 N.E.2d 1284 (1987)
---------end------ 30. See, e.g., Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987);
Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987): James Wilson was arrested for distributing unsigned handbills opposing a candidate for the state senate in violation of state statute prohibiting anonymous campaign literature (that which, inter alia, "is designed to influence the voters on the nomination or election of a candidate"). Relying heavily on Talley, the Court held the statute was facially overbroad.
United States v. Insco, 365 F. Supp. 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1973); In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974); People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284 (Ill. 1987); State v. Fulton, 337 So.2d 866 (La. 1976); State v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978)
http://lw.bna.com/lw/19990309/981636.htm
rtl v bartlett
Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997): Candidate for township advisory board placed sign expressly advocating her election but which did not identify who paid for it, in violation of state statute requiring such identification on "material in support of or in opposition to a candidate" and requiring (in some instances) whether such material was approved by the candidate in support of whom it was published or circulated. Court held that statute was unconstitutional.
Virginia Society For Human Life, Inc. v. Caldwell, 500 S.E.2d 814 (1998) (VSHL)
Opinion of the Oregon Attorney General, Number 8266, 1999 WL 133100 (March 10, 1999): Oregon Attorney General opined that state statute prohibiting most anonymous signs, publications and broadcasts used in political campaigns violated the free speech provisions of both the United States and Oregon Constitutions. The opinion noted, however, that courts subsequent to McIntyre have disagreed on the scope of the First Amendment’s protection for anonymity. Id. at 46. Comparing VSHL (narrowly construing statute to prohibit only anonymous express advocacy (thereby implicitly concluding that such prohibitions are constitutional)) with Moses (striking down statute in toto).
Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W. 2d 873 (Ky. 1976); but see People v. White, 116 Ill. 2d 171, 506 N.E.2d 1284 (1987)
---------end------ 30. See, e.g., Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987);
Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987): James Wilson was arrested for distributing unsigned handbills opposing a candidate for the state senate in violation of state statute prohibiting anonymous campaign literature (that which, inter alia, "is designed to influence the voters on the nomination or election of a candidate"). Relying heavily on Talley, the Court held the statute was facially overbroad.
United States v. Insco, 365 F. Supp. 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1973); In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974); People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284 (Ill. 1987); State v. Fulton, 337 So.2d 866 (La. 1976); State v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978)
http://lw.bna.com/lw/19990309/981636.htm
rtl v bartlett
Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997): Candidate for township advisory board placed sign expressly advocating her election but which did not identify who paid for it, in violation of state statute requiring such identification on "material in support of or in opposition to a candidate" and requiring (in some instances) whether such material was approved by the candidate in support of whom it was published or circulated. Court held that statute was unconstitutional.
Virginia Society For Human Life, Inc. v. Caldwell, 500 S.E.2d 814 (1998) (VSHL)
Opinion of the Oregon Attorney General, Number 8266, 1999 WL 133100 (March 10, 1999): Oregon Attorney General opined that state statute prohibiting most anonymous signs, publications and broadcasts used in political campaigns violated the free speech provisions of both the United States and Oregon Constitutions. The opinion noted, however, that courts subsequent to McIntyre have disagreed on the scope of the First Amendment’s protection for anonymity. Id. at 46. Comparing VSHL (narrowly construing statute to prohibit only anonymous express advocacy (thereby implicitly concluding that such prohibitions are constitutional)) with Moses (striking down statute in toto).
http://www.fec.gov/members/mason/masonarticle2.htm
Anonymity and the Internet:
Constitutional Issues in Campaign Finance Regulation
Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987):
State v. Moses, 655 So.2d 779 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1995) (first post-McIntyre decision): Napoleon Moses was indicted for violating a Louisiana statute that prohibited the distribution of campaign literature which did not contain the name (and in some cases the address) of the person distributing it. The Court held that McIntyre was sufficient authority for striking down the statute, given that, under the Louisiana Constitution and caselaw, "the state interest required to justify even a limited prohibition on election-related anonymous literature in Louisiana should be much more compelling than that which theoretically the U.S. Supreme Court [in McIntyre] might have found sufficient in Ohio or elsewhere." Id. at 782. (The Court seemed to conclude that the statute was unconstitutional under both the federal and state constitutions: "We conclude that the right to distribute anonymous campaign literature is clearly protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court and by . . . the Louisiana Constitution. Accordingly, we declare [the statute] to be unconstitutional." Id. at 785.]
Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995):
... experience will prepare him for a career that likely will take him to other countries, Goodin said. Like Moore, he has traveled abroad before. In October 2002, he traveled with an Alcorn group led by ASU professor Dr. Napoleon Moses, dean of the Department of Industrial Technology, to Ghana. "We'll have some time to travel and sightsee, but we expect to work full time, dedicated to the studies and work we're assigned to do," Goodin said.
University Relations
News Bureau (662) 325-xxxx
Contact: Maridith Geuder
Dec. 18, 2001
STARKVILLE, Miss.--Sharing library resources, faculty expertise and distance learning technologies, Mississippi's two land-grant institutions are launching an academic partnership designed to enhance regional workforce skills.
Beginning in January with the 2002 spring semester, Alcorn State and Mississippi State universities will offer a collaborative master's degree program in workforce education leadership, said Clayborne D. Taylor, MSU dean of continuing education.
"The curriculum has been developed based on needs identified by a five-state community college survey we conducted in 1998," he said.
Taylor said responding community college presidents identified an increased need for rural community college leaders with the skills necessary to coordinate collaborations among two-year institutions, K-12 schools, industry, and government agencies. Responses from Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Tennessee also showed a potential pool of as many as 1,000 individuals requiring or desiring a graduate degree in the major.
Additionally, he added, the survey indicated that as many as 40 community college leadership positions will need to be filled in the next several years.
Already collaborating on a doctoral degree in community college leadership, ASU and MSU determined they could combine resources to create an additional targeted and efficient educational delivery system, said Napoleon Moses, dean of ASU's School of Agriculture and Applied Sciences.
Napoleon Moses, (225) 778-xxxx, 4506 Ashland St, Baker, LA 70714
Anonymity and the Internet:
Constitutional Issues in Campaign Finance Regulation
Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987):
State v. Moses, 655 So.2d 779 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1995) (first post-McIntyre decision): Napoleon Moses was indicted for violating a Louisiana statute that prohibited the distribution of campaign literature which did not contain the name (and in some cases the address) of the person distributing it. The Court held that McIntyre was sufficient authority for striking down the statute, given that, under the Louisiana Constitution and caselaw, "the state interest required to justify even a limited prohibition on election-related anonymous literature in Louisiana should be much more compelling than that which theoretically the U.S. Supreme Court [in McIntyre] might have found sufficient in Ohio or elsewhere." Id. at 782. (The Court seemed to conclude that the statute was unconstitutional under both the federal and state constitutions: "We conclude that the right to distribute anonymous campaign literature is clearly protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court and by . . . the Louisiana Constitution. Accordingly, we declare [the statute] to be unconstitutional." Id. at 785.]
Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995):
... experience will prepare him for a career that likely will take him to other countries, Goodin said. Like Moore, he has traveled abroad before. In October 2002, he traveled with an Alcorn group led by ASU professor Dr. Napoleon Moses, dean of the Department of Industrial Technology, to Ghana. "We'll have some time to travel and sightsee, but we expect to work full time, dedicated to the studies and work we're assigned to do," Goodin said.
University Relations
News Bureau (662) 325-xxxx
Contact: Maridith Geuder
Dec. 18, 2001
STARKVILLE, Miss.--Sharing library resources, faculty expertise and distance learning technologies, Mississippi's two land-grant institutions are launching an academic partnership designed to enhance regional workforce skills.
Beginning in January with the 2002 spring semester, Alcorn State and Mississippi State universities will offer a collaborative master's degree program in workforce education leadership, said Clayborne D. Taylor, MSU dean of continuing education.
"The curriculum has been developed based on needs identified by a five-state community college survey we conducted in 1998," he said.
Taylor said responding community college presidents identified an increased need for rural community college leaders with the skills necessary to coordinate collaborations among two-year institutions, K-12 schools, industry, and government agencies. Responses from Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Tennessee also showed a potential pool of as many as 1,000 individuals requiring or desiring a graduate degree in the major.
Additionally, he added, the survey indicated that as many as 40 community college leadership positions will need to be filled in the next several years.
Already collaborating on a doctoral degree in community college leadership, ASU and MSU determined they could combine resources to create an additional targeted and efficient educational delivery system, said Napoleon Moses, dean of ASU's School of Agriculture and Applied Sciences.
Napoleon Moses, (225) 778-xxxx, 4506 Ashland St, Baker, LA 70714
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/californiastatecases/g018853.pdf
griset
rancho
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/californiastatecases/g023316.pdf
link
commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju62492.000/hju62492_0.HTM house testimony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. §9-333w
Seymour v. Connecticut Elections Enforcement Commission (Connecticut Supreme Court) (amicus): We prepared an amicus brief in support of a constitutional challenge to a Connecticut election law which requires disclosure on the face of the document of the name of anyone who helps pay for a piece of campaign literature, even where the local supporters of a maverick campaign had spent a very small sum of money and wished to remain anonymous. We argued that this requirement deprives citizens of their right of anonymous expression and also has a chilling effect on expression in the context of campaign literature. The Supreme Court upheld the requirement.
Colorado
Tattered Cover Doc.
Davidson v. Right to Life.
Delaware
Anonymous v Delaware
griset
rancho
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/californiastatecases/g023316.pdf
link
commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju62492.000/hju62492_0.HTM house testimony.
Conn. Gen. Stat. §9-333w
Seymour v. Connecticut Elections Enforcement Commission (Connecticut Supreme Court) (amicus): We prepared an amicus brief in support of a constitutional challenge to a Connecticut election law which requires disclosure on the face of the document of the name of anyone who helps pay for a piece of campaign literature, even where the local supporters of a maverick campaign had spent a very small sum of money and wished to remain anonymous. We argued that this requirement deprives citizens of their right of anonymous expression and also has a chilling effect on expression in the context of campaign literature. The Supreme Court upheld the requirement.
Colorado
Tattered Cover Doc.
Davidson v. Right to Life.
Delaware
Anonymous v Delaware
AZ
. Legal Requirements for Candidate Campaign Advertisements, Literature and Signs
"Disclosure" means disclosing who paid for the advertisement, literature or signs. For written materials, the disclosure must be printed "clearly and legibly in a conspicuous manner." For broadcast advertisements, the disclosure must be spoken. A.R.S. § 16-912(D).
1. When disclosure is required
Campaign literature or advertisements paid for by any political committee must disclose in the literature or advertisement:
• the words "paid for by" followed by
• the name on either the committee's:
• Statement of Organization or
• $500 Threshold Exemption Statement
• [see exceptions for candidate's signs and small items, discussed below]
A.R.S. § 16-912(A).
If the literature or advertisements were paid for by a political committee as an independent expenditure [see A.R.S. § 16-901(14) for definition], the following must be disclosed:
• the names and telephone numbers of the three political committees making the largest contributions to the political committee making the independent expenditure
• if an acronym is used to name a committee, the name of any sponsoring organization of the committee shall be printed or spoken
A.R.S. § 16-912(A) and (B).
2. When disclosure is not required
An individual, acting alone, may post signs on the individual's property regarding any political issue or in support of or opposition to any candidate, or mail political materials without disclosure of who paid for the signs. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
Signs that are paid for by a candidate's campaign committee are not required to include disclosure of who paid for them. A.R.S. § 16-912(C).
Bumper stickers, pins, buttons, pens and similar small items that are too small to contain a disclosure of who paid for them are also exempt for the disclosure requirement. A.R.S. § 16-912(C).
The organizers of a separate segregated fund, set up pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 16-920 and 16-921, may solicit contributions from its members, employees, stockholders, etc., without a disclosure of who paid for the solicitation. A.R.S. § 16-912(C).
.S. § 16-1019.
. Legal Requirements for Candidate Campaign Advertisements, Literature and Signs
"Disclosure" means disclosing who paid for the advertisement, literature or signs. For written materials, the disclosure must be printed "clearly and legibly in a conspicuous manner." For broadcast advertisements, the disclosure must be spoken. A.R.S. § 16-912(D).
1. When disclosure is required
Campaign literature or advertisements paid for by any political committee must disclose in the literature or advertisement:
• the words "paid for by" followed by
• the name on either the committee's:
• Statement of Organization or
• $500 Threshold Exemption Statement
• [see exceptions for candidate's signs and small items, discussed below]
A.R.S. § 16-912(A).
If the literature or advertisements were paid for by a political committee as an independent expenditure [see A.R.S. § 16-901(14) for definition], the following must be disclosed:
• the names and telephone numbers of the three political committees making the largest contributions to the political committee making the independent expenditure
• if an acronym is used to name a committee, the name of any sponsoring organization of the committee shall be printed or spoken
A.R.S. § 16-912(A) and (B).
2. When disclosure is not required
An individual, acting alone, may post signs on the individual's property regarding any political issue or in support of or opposition to any candidate, or mail political materials without disclosure of who paid for the signs. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
Signs that are paid for by a candidate's campaign committee are not required to include disclosure of who paid for them. A.R.S. § 16-912(C).
Bumper stickers, pins, buttons, pens and similar small items that are too small to contain a disclosure of who paid for them are also exempt for the disclosure requirement. A.R.S. § 16-912(C).
The organizers of a separate segregated fund, set up pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 16-920 and 16-921, may solicit contributions from its members, employees, stockholders, etc., without a disclosure of who paid for the solicitation. A.R.S. § 16-912(C).
.S. § 16-1019.
http://touchngo.com/lglcntr/akstats/ Statutes /Title15/Chapter13/Section135.htm
Alaska independent expenditures.
Alaska independent expenditures.
http://touchngo.com/lglcntr/akstats/ Statutes/ Title15/Chapter13/Section090.htm
AS 15.13.090. Identification of Communication.
(a) All communications shall be clearly identified by the words "paid for by" followed by the name and address of the candidate, group, nongroup entity, or individual paying for the communication. In addition, candidates and groups may identify the name of their campaign chairperson.
(b) The provisions of (a) of this section do not apply when the communication
(1) is paid for by an individual acting independently of any group or nongroup entity and independently of any other individual;
(2) is made to influence the outcome of a ballot proposition as that term is defined by AS 15.13.065 (c); and
(3) is made for
(A) a billboard or sign; or
(B) printed material other than an advertisement made in a newspaper or other periodical.
AS 15.13.090. Identification of Communication.
(a) All communications shall be clearly identified by the words "paid for by" followed by the name and address of the candidate, group, nongroup entity, or individual paying for the communication. In addition, candidates and groups may identify the name of their campaign chairperson.
(b) The provisions of (a) of this section do not apply when the communication
(1) is paid for by an individual acting independently of any group or nongroup entity and independently of any other individual;
(2) is made to influence the outcome of a ballot proposition as that term is defined by AS 15.13.065 (c); and
(3) is made for
(A) a billboard or sign; or
(B) printed material other than an advertisement made in a newspaper or other periodical.
Ala. Code §§ 17-22A-1 thru 17-22A-23 (Fair Campaign Practices Act)
Ala. Const. Art 1, §
Ala. Code §§ 17-22A-1 thru 17-22A-23 (Fair Campaign Practices Act)
Plaintiff Christian Coalition of Alabama (CCA) was a non-profit, tax-exempt Alabama corporation whose purpose was to educate, inform and mobilize Christians to become active in the public arena in support of causes reflecting Christian values. CCA had in the past spent over $1,000 a year to produce and distribute communications concerning public issues and candidates' positions on them. CCA had never expressly advocated the election or defeat of a candidate for public office. Nor had CCA historically expended funds to expressly advocate the passage or defeat of any constitutional amendment or other ballot measure. However, in 1999 the Alabama Legislature submitted to popular vote a proposed constitutional amendment to allow a state lottery and CCA formed the intention to distribute, at a cost exceeding $1,000, voter guides explicitly urging voters to reject the proposed constitutional amendment. However, CCA elected not to do so because it understood that taking such action would subject it to the provisions of Alabama's Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA), Ala. Code §§ 17-22A-1 to -23, which carried consequences and imposed obligations that CCA was unwilling to accept. Approximately five weeks before the scheduled vote on the proposed constitutional amendment, the plaintiffs – who were apparently are not members of CCA but had received CCA communications in the past – filed this action. At the same time, they filed motions for a temporary restraining order and for a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the FCPA. The court denied both motions. In October 1999, the proposed constitutional amendment was defeated. Subsequently, ruling on the substance of plaintiffs’ complaint, the district court held that Code of Alabama, §§ 17-22A-3, 17-22A-5 and 17-22A-6 were unconstitutional as applied to any person whose major purpose is not to engage in election activity Case # 929N (3/01) (S.D. Ala.)
http://www.sos.state.al.us/election/cfi/glad2002.htm
The Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA) addresses advertising requirements in three sections of the Code of Alabama, 1975:
§17-22A-12. Paid advertisements to be identified as such.
Any paid political advertisement appearing in any print media or broadcast on any electronic media shall be clearly identified or marked as a paid advertisement. It shall be unlawful for any person, candidate, principal campaign committee or other political committee to broadcast, publish or circulate any campaign literature or political advertisement, without a notice appearing on the face or front page of any printed matter, or broadcast at the beginning or end of a radio or television spot, stating that the communication was a paid advertisement and giving the identification (emphasis added) of the person, principal campaign committee or other political committee that paid for or otherwise authorized such communication.
§17-22A-13. Cards, pamphlets, circulars, etc., to bear name of candidate, committee, etc.
It shall be unlawful for any person, candidate, principal campaign committee, or other political committee to publish or distribute or display, or cause to be published or distributed or displayed, any card, pamphlet, circular, poster, or other printed material relating to or concerning any election, which does not contain the identification (emphasis added) of the person, candidate, principal campaign committee, or other political committee responsible for the publication or distribution or display of the same.
§17-22A-2.Definitions.
(5) IDENTIFICATION.
The full name and complete address.
The Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA) addresses advertising requirements in three sections of the Code of Alabama, 1975:
§17-22A-12. Paid advertisements to be identified as such.
Any paid political advertisement appearing in any print media or broadcast on any electronic media shall be clearly identified or marked as a paid advertisement. It shall be unlawful for any person, candidate, principal campaign committee or other political committee to broadcast, publish or circulate any campaign literature or political advertisement, without a notice appearing on the face or front page of any printed matter, or broadcast at the beginning or end of a radio or television spot, stating that the communication was a paid advertisement and giving the identification (emphasis added) of the person, principal campaign committee or other political committee that paid for or otherwise authorized such communication.
§17-22A-13. Cards, pamphlets, circulars, etc., to bear name of candidate, committee, etc.
It shall be unlawful for any person, candidate, principal campaign committee, or other political committee to publish or distribute or display, or cause to be published or distributed or displayed, any card, pamphlet, circular, poster, or other printed material relating to or concerning any election, which does not contain the identification (emphasis added) of the person, candidate, principal campaign committee, or other political committee responsible for the publication or distribution or display of the same.
§17-22A-2.Definitions.
(5) IDENTIFICATION.
The full name and complete address.
See Ala. Code §17-22A%13 (Supp. 1994); Alaska Stat. Ann. §15.56.010 (1988); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §16-912 (Supp. 1994); Ark. Code Ann. §7-1-103 (1993); Colo. Rev. Stat. §1-13-108 (Supp. 1994); Conn. Gen. Stat. §9-333w (Supp. 1994); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 15, §§8021, 8023 (1993); Fla. Stat. §§106.143 and 106.1437 (1992); Ga.Code Ann. §21-2-415 (1993); Haw. Rev. Stat. §11-215 (1988); Idaho Code §67-6614A (Supp. 1994); Ill. Comp. Stat. §5/29-14 (1993); Ind. Code §3-14-1-4 (Supp. 1994); Iowa Code §56.14 (1991); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§25-2407 and 25-4156 (Supp. 1991); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §121.190 (Baldwin Supp. 1994); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18:1463 (West Supp. 1994); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21-A, §1014 (1993); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 33, §26-17 (1993); Mass. Gen. Laws §41 (1990); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §169.247 (West 1989); Minn. Stat. §211B.04 (1994); Miss. Code Ann. §23-15-899 (1990); Mo. Rev. Stat. §130.031 (Supp. 1994); Mont. Code Ann. §13-35-225 (1993); Neb. Rev. Stat. §49-1474.01 (1993); Nev. Rev. Stat. §294A.320 (Supp. 1993); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §664:14 (Supp. 1992); N. J. Stat. Ann. §19:34-38.1 (1989); N. M. Stat. Ann. §§1-19-16 and 1-19-17 (1991); N. Y. Elec. Law §14-106 (McKinney 1978); N. C. Gen. Stat. §163-274 (Supp. 1994); N. D. Cent. Code §16.1-10-04.1 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3599.09(A) (1988); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §1840 (Supp. 1995); Ore. Rev. Stat. §260.522 (1991); 25 Pa. Cons. Stat. §3258 (1994); R. I. Gen. Laws §17-23-2 (1988); S. C. Code Ann. §8-13-1354 (Supp. 1993); S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. §12-25-4.1 (Supp. 1994); Tenn. Code Ann. §2-19-120 (Supp. 1994); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §255.001 (Supp. 1995); Utah Code Ann. §20-14-24 (Supp. 1994);
Monday, February 23, 2004
October 29, 2003
GOVERNOR SIGNS LEGISLATION DESIGNATING THE PERRY B. DURYEA, JR. STATE OFFICE BUILDING IN SUFFOLK COUNTY
Building Named After Renowned Former Assembly Speaker From Suffolk County
Governor George E. Pataki today joined State and local officials at a ceremony officially designating the Perry B. Duryea, Jr. State Office Building on Veterans Memorial Highway in the Town of Islip, Suffolk County. The Governor signed legislation naming the building for the former Speaker of the Assembly in honor of his contributions and commitment to the people of Long Island and New York State.
“Perry Duryea remains one of the most highly respected and admired Assembly Speakers in State history,” Governor Pataki said. “During his long and distinguished career in public service, Speaker Duryea dedicated his heart and soul to the people of New York, and especially the citizens of Long Island. More.
Duryea was the crook who was aquitted in Duryea v. People of New York (1972).People v. Duryea, 76 Misc. 2d 948, 351 N. Y. S. 2d 978 (Sup.), aff'd, 44 App. Div. 2d 663, 354 N. Y. S. 2d 129 (1974).
GOVERNOR SIGNS LEGISLATION DESIGNATING THE PERRY B. DURYEA, JR. STATE OFFICE BUILDING IN SUFFOLK COUNTY
Building Named After Renowned Former Assembly Speaker From Suffolk County
Governor George E. Pataki today joined State and local officials at a ceremony officially designating the Perry B. Duryea, Jr. State Office Building on Veterans Memorial Highway in the Town of Islip, Suffolk County. The Governor signed legislation naming the building for the former Speaker of the Assembly in honor of his contributions and commitment to the people of Long Island and New York State.
“Perry Duryea remains one of the most highly respected and admired Assembly Speakers in State history,” Governor Pataki said. “During his long and distinguished career in public service, Speaker Duryea dedicated his heart and soul to the people of New York, and especially the citizens of Long Island. More.
Duryea was the crook who was aquitted in Duryea v. People of New York (1972).People v. Duryea, 76 Misc. 2d 948, 351 N. Y. S. 2d 978 (Sup.), aff'd, 44 App. Div. 2d 663, 354 N. Y. S. 2d 129 (1974).
Thursday, February 19, 2004
Oral argument and briefs in majors.
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/farg/arg.fwx?caseno=02-2204&submit=showdkt&yr=02&num=2204
decision (pdf) http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/7th/022204p.pdf
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/briefs.htm
02-2204 : Majors, Brian v. Foster, Mark
Case Type: Civil ; Nature of Suit: Const Of State Statutes-fedque
File Name Doc Uploaded Filed Description
02-2204_003.pdf 1 06/13/2002 06/17/2002 Appellant Brief
02-2204_003A.pdf 2 08/02/2002 08/05/2002 Appellee Brief (for all other Appellees)
02-2204_004.pdf 3 08/08/2002 08/08/2002 Appellee Brief (for Abell and Foster)
02-2204_005.pdf 4 08/21/2002 08/22/2002 Appellant Reply Brief
02-2204_005A.pdf 5 10/28/2002 06/17/2002 Appellant Short Appendix
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/farg/arg.fwx?caseno=02-2204&submit=showdkt&yr=02&num=2204
decision (pdf) http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/7th/022204p.pdf
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/briefs.htm
02-2204 : Majors, Brian v. Foster, Mark
Case Type: Civil ; Nature of Suit: Const Of State Statutes-fedque
File Name Doc Uploaded Filed Description
02-2204_003.pdf 1 06/13/2002 06/17/2002 Appellant Brief
02-2204_003A.pdf 2 08/02/2002 08/05/2002 Appellee Brief (for all other Appellees)
02-2204_004.pdf 3 08/08/2002 08/08/2002 Appellee Brief (for Abell and Foster)
02-2204_005.pdf 4 08/21/2002 08/22/2002 Appellant Reply Brief
02-2204_005A.pdf 5 10/28/2002 06/17/2002 Appellant Short Appendix
FindLaw: STEWART v TAYLOR
http://laws.findlaw.com/7th/963108.html
http://laws.findlaw.com/7th/963108.html
http://www.findlaw.com/casecode/index.html#statelaw
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Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
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New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
1st - ME, MA, NH, PR, RI
2nd - NY, VT, CT
3rd - PA, NJ, DE, VI
4th - MD, NC, SC, VA, WV
5th - LA, TX, MS
6th - MI, OH, KY TN
7th - IL, IN, WI 8th - ND, SD, MN, NE, IA, MO AR
9th - CA, OR, WA, AZ, MT, ID, NV, AK, HI
10th - CO, KS, NM, OK, UT, WY
11th - AL, GA, FL
DC - DC, Tax Court, fed admin agencies.
Federal Patent, Int'l Trade, Claims Court and Veterans' Appeals.
2nd - NY, VT, CT
3rd - PA, NJ, DE, VI
4th - MD, NC, SC, VA, WV
5th - LA, TX, MS
6th - MI, OH, KY TN
7th - IL, IN, WI 8th - ND, SD, MN, NE, IA, MO AR
9th - CA, OR, WA, AZ, MT, ID, NV, AK, HI
10th - CO, KS, NM, OK, UT, WY
11th - AL, GA, FL
DC - DC, Tax Court, fed admin agencies.
Federal Patent, Int'l Trade, Claims Court and Veterans' Appeals.
Stewart v. Taylor, 934 F. Supp. 1040, 1041 (S. D. Ind. 1996) look it up
(superceded by 7th cir but still.)
(superceded by 7th cir but still.)
Wednesday, February 18, 2004
Mo Libertarian Party v. Conger
Here's the entire opinion.
It effectively repeals the Missouri Constitution.
It misstates the standard of review.
It misstates the constitutional provision in question.
On the other hand, it does not seem as though plaintiffs did a good job.
They fail to cite the relevant state constitutional provision, except section 8, they bring a case which is a loser under the first amendment, without first establishing precedents in easy cases. They fail to distinguish this case from Lamb by showing no corruption by third parties.
What can I do about it? Contact bevis shock, ask if he wants to represent me in a challenge to the Missouri disclaimer statute.
If he says yes, I would then write a brief.
Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED. All concur.
Opinion:Case Number: SC84869
Handdown Date: 11/01/2002
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Cole County, Hon. Thomas J. Brown, III, Judge
Counsel for Appellant: W. Bevis Schock
Counsel for Respondent: Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, James R. Layton and Paul R. Magufee
Opinion Summary:
PER CURIAM
Section 130.032.4, RSMo 2000, limits the amounts that political party committees may contribute to candidates. Charles Taylor is a Libertarian Party candidate for state representative. The party has given him the maximum amount permitted by the statute, but seeks to contribute more. The party and Taylor sued to invalidate the limits on the basis that article I, section 8 of the state constitution prohibits such limits.(FN1) The trial court denied relief. That judgment is affirmed. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.
An act of the legislature carries a strong presumption of constitutionality. Home Builders Ass'n of Greater St. Louis v. State, 75 S.W.3d 267, 269 (Mo. banc 2002). This Court will not invalidate a statute unless it clearly and undoubtedly contravenes the constitution and plainly and palpably affronts fundamental law embodied in the constitu-tion. Smith v. Coffey, 37 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Mo. banc 2001).
Appellants contend that the right to free speech granted by article I, section 8 is broader than that granted under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and that it gives them an absolute right to communicate their support for a particular candidate by contributing any amount they wish to that candidate, without restriction. This Court disagrees.
Assuming without deciding that appellants are correct that, under article I, section 8 of Missouri's constitution, a contribution to a political candidate does constitute a form of speech subject to its protection, section 8 has never been held to give an absolute right to communicate ideas at all times and under all circumstances. As appellants note, the limits contained in section 130.032.4 do not violate the rights protected by the First Amendment. Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 270 F.3d 567, 570 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Missouri Republican Party v. Connor, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S. Ct. 2329 (2002). Rather, the Supreme Court has stated, for First Amendment purposes, the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption justify restrictions on contributions, even where political speech is at issue. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388 (2000); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1976).
Missouri courts have also held that the right to free speech is subject to the state's inherent right to reasonably exercise its police power. BBC Fireworks, Inc. v. State Highway and Transp. Com'n, 828 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Mo. banc 1992). While article I, section 8 phrases the right to free speech differently than does the First Amendment, nothing in that phrasing suggests an intent to exempt campaign contributions from police power limitations. To the contrary, this Court recognized in In re Hill, 8 S.W.3d 578, 580-81, 583 (Mo. banc 2000), that the right to free speech must be balanced against the public's interest in preserving the integrity of and public confidence in the judiciary. Similarly, here, the right to free speech, even in a political context, is necessarily subject to the state's inherent right to exercise its police powers to protect the public from corruption and the appearance of corruption. The restriction in section 130.032.4 at issue here serves that purpose and, so, is a proper exercise of the state's police power and does not violate article I, section 8 of Missouri's constitution.
The judgment is affirmed.
Footnotes:
FN1. Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 8 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
That no law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech, no matter by what means communicated: that every person shall be free to say, write or publish, or otherwise communicate whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuses of that liberty . . . .
Here's the entire opinion.
It effectively repeals the Missouri Constitution.
It misstates the standard of review.
It misstates the constitutional provision in question.
On the other hand, it does not seem as though plaintiffs did a good job.
They fail to cite the relevant state constitutional provision, except section 8, they bring a case which is a loser under the first amendment, without first establishing precedents in easy cases. They fail to distinguish this case from Lamb by showing no corruption by third parties.
What can I do about it? Contact bevis shock, ask if he wants to represent me in a challenge to the Missouri disclaimer statute.
If he says yes, I would then write a brief.
Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED. All concur.
Opinion:Case Number: SC84869
Handdown Date: 11/01/2002
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Cole County, Hon. Thomas J. Brown, III, Judge
Counsel for Appellant: W. Bevis Schock
Counsel for Respondent: Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, James R. Layton and Paul R. Magufee
Opinion Summary:
PER CURIAM
Section 130.032.4, RSMo 2000, limits the amounts that political party committees may contribute to candidates. Charles Taylor is a Libertarian Party candidate for state representative. The party has given him the maximum amount permitted by the statute, but seeks to contribute more. The party and Taylor sued to invalidate the limits on the basis that article I, section 8 of the state constitution prohibits such limits.(FN1) The trial court denied relief. That judgment is affirmed. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.
An act of the legislature carries a strong presumption of constitutionality. Home Builders Ass'n of Greater St. Louis v. State, 75 S.W.3d 267, 269 (Mo. banc 2002). This Court will not invalidate a statute unless it clearly and undoubtedly contravenes the constitution and plainly and palpably affronts fundamental law embodied in the constitu-tion. Smith v. Coffey, 37 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Mo. banc 2001).
Appellants contend that the right to free speech granted by article I, section 8 is broader than that granted under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and that it gives them an absolute right to communicate their support for a particular candidate by contributing any amount they wish to that candidate, without restriction. This Court disagrees.
Assuming without deciding that appellants are correct that, under article I, section 8 of Missouri's constitution, a contribution to a political candidate does constitute a form of speech subject to its protection, section 8 has never been held to give an absolute right to communicate ideas at all times and under all circumstances. As appellants note, the limits contained in section 130.032.4 do not violate the rights protected by the First Amendment. Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 270 F.3d 567, 570 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Missouri Republican Party v. Connor, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S. Ct. 2329 (2002). Rather, the Supreme Court has stated, for First Amendment purposes, the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption justify restrictions on contributions, even where political speech is at issue. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388 (2000); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1976).
Missouri courts have also held that the right to free speech is subject to the state's inherent right to reasonably exercise its police power. BBC Fireworks, Inc. v. State Highway and Transp. Com'n, 828 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Mo. banc 1992). While article I, section 8 phrases the right to free speech differently than does the First Amendment, nothing in that phrasing suggests an intent to exempt campaign contributions from police power limitations. To the contrary, this Court recognized in In re Hill, 8 S.W.3d 578, 580-81, 583 (Mo. banc 2000), that the right to free speech must be balanced against the public's interest in preserving the integrity of and public confidence in the judiciary. Similarly, here, the right to free speech, even in a political context, is necessarily subject to the state's inherent right to exercise its police powers to protect the public from corruption and the appearance of corruption. The restriction in section 130.032.4 at issue here serves that purpose and, so, is a proper exercise of the state's police power and does not violate article I, section 8 of Missouri's constitution.
The judgment is affirmed.
Footnotes:
FN1. Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 8 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
That no law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech, no matter by what means communicated: that every person shall be free to say, write or publish, or otherwise communicate whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuses of that liberty . . . .
Sunday, February 15, 2004
Ballot Access News coverage
4. Indiana: on January 23, the 7th circuit revived a lawsuit against the state's ban on anonymous campaign literature (the U.S. District Court had dismissed it), and sent it to the State Supreme Court to see if the law applies just to candidates, or to all individuals. Majors v Abell, 02-2204. If the State Court says it applies to everyone, it will probably then be held unconstitutional.
(BAN is the only publication I consistently subscribe to. I met Richard Winger when I was 17, when we were lobbying for better ballot access in my home state. He is one of the reasons I'm an election law lawyer. Curiously, he doesn't look a day older now. I do.)
5. Missouri: on November 1, 2002, the State Supreme Court upheld a law limiting the amount of money a party can contribute to its own candidates. Missouri Libertarian Party v Conger, 88 SW 3d 446.
I'd missed that. Must go read. (I'm a former chair, vice-chair, of the Mo LP, and interned on the Mo. S. Ct.)
http://www.moga.state.mo.us/statutes/C100-199/1300000031.HTM
(disclaimer statute, annotated)
http://www.moga.state.mo.us/statutes/C100-199/1300000032.HTM
(contribution limits annotated)
Statutory Limit on Contributions From Political Parties to Candidates is Constitutional
The Missouri Libertarian Party and one of its candidates filed suit challenging the limits that a political party may contribute to a candidate, as prescribed by § 130.032, RSMo. The party challenged these limits under Article I, § 8 of the Missouri Constitution, which states that no law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech. The trial court found that the statute did not violate this section of the Missouri Constitution and the Supreme Court of Missouri agreed in Missouri Libertarian Party v. Conger, No. SC 84869 (Mo.banc 2002).
Article I, § 8 of the Missouri Constitution has never been held to give an absolute right to communicate ideas at all times and under all circumstances. The political contribution limits contained in § 130.023, RSMo. do not violate the right protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Missouri courts have also held that the right to free speech is subject to the state's inherent right to reasonably exercise its police power. Here, the right to free speech is necessarily subject to the state's inherent right – even in a political context – to exercise its police powers to protect the public from corruption and the appearance of corruption. The restriction on contributions in § 130.032 serves that purpose and is a proper exercise of the state's police power.
Yoiks! That's a horrible opinion. Here
4. Indiana: on January 23, the 7th circuit revived a lawsuit against the state's ban on anonymous campaign literature (the U.S. District Court had dismissed it), and sent it to the State Supreme Court to see if the law applies just to candidates, or to all individuals. Majors v Abell, 02-2204. If the State Court says it applies to everyone, it will probably then be held unconstitutional.
(BAN is the only publication I consistently subscribe to. I met Richard Winger when I was 17, when we were lobbying for better ballot access in my home state. He is one of the reasons I'm an election law lawyer. Curiously, he doesn't look a day older now. I do.)
5. Missouri: on November 1, 2002, the State Supreme Court upheld a law limiting the amount of money a party can contribute to its own candidates. Missouri Libertarian Party v Conger, 88 SW 3d 446.
I'd missed that. Must go read. (I'm a former chair, vice-chair, of the Mo LP, and interned on the Mo. S. Ct.)
http://www.moga.state.mo.us/statutes/C100-199/1300000031.HTM
(disclaimer statute, annotated)
http://www.moga.state.mo.us/statutes/C100-199/1300000032.HTM
(contribution limits annotated)
Statutory Limit on Contributions From Political Parties to Candidates is Constitutional
The Missouri Libertarian Party and one of its candidates filed suit challenging the limits that a political party may contribute to a candidate, as prescribed by § 130.032, RSMo. The party challenged these limits under Article I, § 8 of the Missouri Constitution, which states that no law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech. The trial court found that the statute did not violate this section of the Missouri Constitution and the Supreme Court of Missouri agreed in Missouri Libertarian Party v. Conger, No. SC 84869 (Mo.banc 2002).
Article I, § 8 of the Missouri Constitution has never been held to give an absolute right to communicate ideas at all times and under all circumstances. The political contribution limits contained in § 130.023, RSMo. do not violate the right protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Missouri courts have also held that the right to free speech is subject to the state's inherent right to reasonably exercise its police power. Here, the right to free speech is necessarily subject to the state's inherent right – even in a political context – to exercise its police powers to protect the public from corruption and the appearance of corruption. The restriction on contributions in § 130.032 serves that purpose and is a proper exercise of the state's police power.
Yoiks! That's a horrible opinion. Here
docket entries at ind sup ct
Cases citing majors v abell 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003)(Posner,J):
cal. pro-life v. getman
As the Seventh Circuit recently observed in a context very similar to this case:
A plaintiff who mounts a pre-enforcement
challenge to a statute that he claims violates his freedom of speech need not show that the authorities have threatened to prosecute him; the threat is latent in the existence of the statute. Not if it clearly fails to cover his conduct, of course. But if it arguably covers it, and so may deter constitutionally protected expression because most people are frightened of violating criminal statutes especially when the gains are slight, as they would be for people seeking only to make a political point and not themselves political operatives, there is standing.
Majors v. Abell , 317 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 2003)
minnesota citizens for life v kelly (pdf)
http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtweb/pdf/D08MNXC/03-09227.PDF
Az RtL v. Bayless
Because ARLPAC reasonably feared prosecution under § 16-917 for engaging in protected speech, ARLPAC has standing to challenge the statute. See Majors v. Abell , ___ F.3d ___, 2003 WL 152431 (7th Cir., Jan. 23, 2003) (holding in political advertising case that if a statute "may deter constitutionally protected expression because most people are frightened of violating criminal statutes . . . , there is standing." ).
Ogden v Marendt.
See
Majors v. Abell, 317 F. 3d 719, 722 (7 th Cir. 2003) (reversing dismissal for lack of
standing by reason of candidate's failure to run in recent elections because "[ a]
candidate plaintiff no more has a duty to run in every election in order to keep his suit
alive than an abortion plaintiff has a duty to become pregnant again in order to keep her
suit alive.") -11-ability of a party to spread its message and hamstrings voters seeking to inform
themselves about the candidates and the campaign issues.")
http://www.cfac.org/
cal first amendment coalition, archives getman.
cal. pro-life v. getman
As the Seventh Circuit recently observed in a context very similar to this case:
A plaintiff who mounts a pre-enforcement
challenge to a statute that he claims violates his freedom of speech need not show that the authorities have threatened to prosecute him; the threat is latent in the existence of the statute. Not if it clearly fails to cover his conduct, of course. But if it arguably covers it, and so may deter constitutionally protected expression because most people are frightened of violating criminal statutes especially when the gains are slight, as they would be for people seeking only to make a political point and not themselves political operatives, there is standing.
Majors v. Abell , 317 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 2003)
minnesota citizens for life v kelly (pdf)
http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtweb/pdf/D08MNXC/03-09227.PDF
Az RtL v. Bayless
Because ARLPAC reasonably feared prosecution under § 16-917 for engaging in protected speech, ARLPAC has standing to challenge the statute. See Majors v. Abell , ___ F.3d ___, 2003 WL 152431 (7th Cir., Jan. 23, 2003) (holding in political advertising case that if a statute "may deter constitutionally protected expression because most people are frightened of violating criminal statutes . . . , there is standing." ).
Ogden v Marendt.
See
Majors v. Abell, 317 F. 3d 719, 722 (7 th Cir. 2003) (reversing dismissal for lack of
standing by reason of candidate's failure to run in recent elections because "[ a]
candidate plaintiff no more has a duty to run in every election in order to keep his suit
alive than an abortion plaintiff has a duty to become pregnant again in order to keep her
suit alive.") -11-ability of a party to spread its message and hamstrings voters seeking to inform
themselves about the candidates and the campaign issues.")
http://www.cfac.org/
cal first amendment coalition, archives getman.
5:33 pm. blog clock not set to my time, keep in mind for billing records
notes from hynes v. city of oradell
HYNES v. MAYOR OF ORADELL, 425 U.S. 610 (1976)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/425/610.html
Regulation in this area "must be done, and the restriction applied, in such a manner as not to intrude upon the rights of free speech and free assembly," Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 -541 (1945).
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938),
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). As a matter of due process, "[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)
The general test of vagueness applies with particular force in review of laws dealing with speech. "[S]tricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 76 -82 (1976); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 -612 (1973).
Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 75-85 (1960).
---
cases that found disclosure to unconstitutionally infringe on freedom of association
DeGREGORY v. NEW HAMP. ATTY. GEN., 383 U.S. 825 (1966)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/383/825.html
GIBSON v. FLORIDA LEGISLATIVE COMM., 372 U.S. 539 (1963)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/372/539.html
LOUISIANA v. N. A. A. C. P., 366 U.S. 293 (1961)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/366/293.html
SHELTON v. TUCKER, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/364/479.html
HYNES v. MAYOR OF ORADELL, 425 U.S. 610 (1976)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/425/610.html
Regulation in this area "must be done, and the restriction applied, in such a manner as not to intrude upon the rights of free speech and free assembly," Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 -541 (1945).
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938),
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). As a matter of due process, "[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)
The general test of vagueness applies with particular force in review of laws dealing with speech. "[S]tricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 76 -82 (1976); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 -612 (1973).
Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 75-85 (1960).
---
cases that found disclosure to unconstitutionally infringe on freedom of association
DeGREGORY v. NEW HAMP. ATTY. GEN., 383 U.S. 825 (1966)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/383/825.html
GIBSON v. FLORIDA LEGISLATIVE COMM., 372 U.S. 539 (1963)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/372/539.html
LOUISIANA v. N. A. A. C. P., 366 U.S. 293 (1961)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/366/293.html
SHELTON v. TUCKER, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/364/479.html
did: added links to cases. mcintyre etc.
to do: add links to cases. mcintyre etc.
Friday, February 13, 2004
To do: make list of where else to sue/negotiate. Get the old project going again.
To do: write memo on errors in the state supreme court ruling in Majors.
Re-read my response brief. Track false statements from the amicus brief that made it into the opinion.
To do: find brian majors.
prepare 2003 status report.
scalia's infamous footnote 2.
See Ala. Code 17-22A-13 (Supp. 1994); Alaska Stat. Ann. 15.56.010 (1988); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 16-912 (Supp. 1994); Ark. Code Ann. 7-1-103 (1993); Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-13-108 (Supp. 1994); Conn. Gen. Stat. 9-333w (Supp. 1994); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 15, [ McINTYRE v. OHIO ELECTIONS COMM'N, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 7] 8021, 8023 (1993); Fla. Stat. 106.143 and 106.1437 (1992); Ga. Code Ann. 21-2-415 (1993); Haw. Rev. Stat. 11-215 (1988); Idaho Code 67-6614A (Supp. 1994); Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/29-14 (1993); Ind. Code 3-14-1-4 (Supp. 1994); Iowa Code 56.14 (1991); Kan. Stat. Ann. 25-2407 and 25-4156 (Supp. 1991); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 121.190 (Baldwin Supp. 1994); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 18:1463 (West Supp. 1994); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21-A, 1014 (1993); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 33, 26-17 (1993); Mass. Gen. Laws 41 (1990); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 169.247 (West 1989); Minn. Stat. 211B.04 (1994); Miss. Code Ann. 23-15-899 (1990); Mo. Rev. Stat. 130.031 (Supp. 1994); Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-225 (1993); Neb. Rev. Stat. 49-1474.01 (1993); Nev. Rev. Stat. 294A.320 (Supp. 1993); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 664:14 (Supp. 1992); N. J. Stat. Ann. 19:34-38.1 (1989); N. M. Stat. Ann. 1-19-16 and 1-19-17 (1991); N. Y. Elec. Law 14-106 (McKinney 1978); N.C. Gen. Stat. 163-274 (Supp. 1994); N. D. Cent. Code 16.1-10-04.1 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3599.09(A) (1988); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, 1840 (Supp. 1995); Ore. Rev. Stat. 260.522 (1991); 25 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3258 (1994); R. I. Gen. Laws 17-23-2 (1988); S. C. Code Ann. 8-13-1354 (Supp. 1993); S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. 12-25-4.1 (Supp. 1994); Tenn. Code Ann. 2-19-120 (Supp. 1994); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. 255.001 (Supp. 1995); Utah Code Ann. 20-14-24 (Supp. 1994); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, 2022 (1982); Va. Code Ann. 24.2-1014 (1993); Wash. Rev. Code 42.17.510 (Supp. 1994); W. Va. Code 3-8-12 (1994); Wis. Stat. 11.30 (Supp. 1994); Wyo. Stat. 22-25-110 (1992).
To do: write memo on errors in the state supreme court ruling in Majors.
Re-read my response brief. Track false statements from the amicus brief that made it into the opinion.
To do: find brian majors.
prepare 2003 status report.
scalia's infamous footnote 2.
See Ala. Code 17-22A-13 (Supp. 1994); Alaska Stat. Ann. 15.56.010 (1988); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 16-912 (Supp. 1994); Ark. Code Ann. 7-1-103 (1993); Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-13-108 (Supp. 1994); Conn. Gen. Stat. 9-333w (Supp. 1994); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 15, [ McINTYRE v. OHIO ELECTIONS COMM'N, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 7] 8021, 8023 (1993); Fla. Stat. 106.143 and 106.1437 (1992); Ga. Code Ann. 21-2-415 (1993); Haw. Rev. Stat. 11-215 (1988); Idaho Code 67-6614A (Supp. 1994); Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/29-14 (1993); Ind. Code 3-14-1-4 (Supp. 1994); Iowa Code 56.14 (1991); Kan. Stat. Ann. 25-2407 and 25-4156 (Supp. 1991); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 121.190 (Baldwin Supp. 1994); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 18:1463 (West Supp. 1994); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21-A, 1014 (1993); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 33, 26-17 (1993); Mass. Gen. Laws 41 (1990); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 169.247 (West 1989); Minn. Stat. 211B.04 (1994); Miss. Code Ann. 23-15-899 (1990); Mo. Rev. Stat. 130.031 (Supp. 1994); Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-225 (1993); Neb. Rev. Stat. 49-1474.01 (1993); Nev. Rev. Stat. 294A.320 (Supp. 1993); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 664:14 (Supp. 1992); N. J. Stat. Ann. 19:34-38.1 (1989); N. M. Stat. Ann. 1-19-16 and 1-19-17 (1991); N. Y. Elec. Law 14-106 (McKinney 1978); N.C. Gen. Stat. 163-274 (Supp. 1994); N. D. Cent. Code 16.1-10-04.1 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3599.09(A) (1988); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, 1840 (Supp. 1995); Ore. Rev. Stat. 260.522 (1991); 25 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3258 (1994); R. I. Gen. Laws 17-23-2 (1988); S. C. Code Ann. 8-13-1354 (Supp. 1993); S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. 12-25-4.1 (Supp. 1994); Tenn. Code Ann. 2-19-120 (Supp. 1994); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. 255.001 (Supp. 1995); Utah Code Ann. 20-14-24 (Supp. 1994); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, 2022 (1982); Va. Code Ann. 24.2-1014 (1993); Wash. Rev. Code 42.17.510 (Supp. 1994); W. Va. Code 3-8-12 (1994); Wis. Stat. 11.30 (Supp. 1994); Wyo. Stat. 22-25-110 (1992).
As expected, motion to strike denied.
